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SEX SEGREGATION, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND
ROBERTS V. U.S. JAYCEES
Elizabeth Sepper*
Would the woman please leave. I can’t teach leadership to a woman.
—J. Terryl Bechtol, 1980 U.S. Jaycees President,
Meeting of Jaycees Chapter Presidents1
Young women are entitled to share in the good jobs in our society
according to their abilities. They will not share fully in these jobs,
however, as long as young men are exclusively eligible for member-
ship in the “right business organization,” which gives them an edge
in hiring for and promotion to leadership positions.
—Judge Gerald Heaney, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 19842
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of sex segregation
in membership organizations.3 The U.S. Jaycees—a national organization with roughly
300,000 members—defended its freedom to associate as a men’s organization against
the state of Minnesota and the Minneapolis and St. Paul Jaycee chapters which had
* Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. My thanks to the
participants and organizers of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium on
Constitutional Rights: Intersections, Synergies, and Conflicts for the helpful discussion and
to Robert Tsai, Willy Forbath, and Deborah Dinner for their generous comments on drafts.
I’m grateful to Allie Amado, Caine Caverly, Brooke Lowell, and rest of the BORJ editorial
staff for their excellent edits.
1 Vin McLellan, “We’re Going to Be Right Again!,” SAVVY, July 1982, at 54.
2 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1583 (8th Cir. 1983) (Heaney, J., dissenting from
petition for rehearing en banc), rev’d sub nom. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
3 See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. 609.
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admitted women.4 The U.S. Jaycees policy dictated that women be granted an inferior
class of membership without opportunities for leadership positions or awards. In
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, a unanimous Court held that the state’s efforts to eliminate
gender-based discrimination in public accommodations outweighed the constitutional
freedom of association asserted by the Jaycees.5
This Symposium on the intersections, synergies, and conflicts between rights—
what Professor Timothy Zick calls rights dynamism6—largely focuses on constitutional
rights and their relationships in judicial decisions.7 From this perspective, Roberts—
and the issue of sex-segregated clubs more generally—stands at the intersection of First
Amendment rights to association, expression, assembly, and privacy. The central issue
is the dynamism (or lack thereof) of the Jaycees’ freedom to associate—a right treated
by the courts as requiring aggregation with another.8 Critics claim that the Court treated
these aggregated constitutional rights too lightly and weighed women’s interest in pub-
lic accommodations equality too heavily.9 But rights construction, or dynamism, is not
so neatly bound by the Constitution.
The decade-long movement to integrate the Jaycees, culminating in the Roberts
decision, forged connections between legal frameworks—federal and state, statute
and constitution—that shaped the meaning of the rights at stake. Judicial narrowing
of state action under the Equal Protection Clause had constrained the ability of local
Jaycee chapters and feminist groups to assert constitutional claims to the integration
of organizations they saw as central to professional and civic participation. Litiga-
tion came to set mere statute against constitutional freedom of association. But the
statutory and cultural commitments of the time influenced the construction of those
constitutional rights.10 In what Zick calls the “distinct, active, dynamic process in which
4 Id. at 613–15.
5 Id. at 611–12.
6 See Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791, 792–93 (2017).
7 TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 84, 86 (2017).
8 Id. at 86 (discussing Roberts only briefly as an example of a case that made freedom
of association dependent on speech).
9 See generally Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-
Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1998); John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN.
L. REV. 149 (2010) (critiquing the decision and proposing ways to reduce some of the uncertainty
engendered); Douglas O. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jay-
cees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878 (1984) (arguing that the opinion sacrifices communitarian values).
10 This is consistent with WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 9 (2010) (“Constitutional law’s evolution
is generally—and ought to be—influenced by the norms entrenched in other ways” and the
Supreme Court’s “triumphs have been in cases where the Court enforced Constitutional
norms consistent with clear statutory consensus, reached after repeated public deliberations
and reflecting an overlapping consensus within the polity.”). See generally Elizabeth Sepper
& Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78 (2019).
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meanings of rights are elaborated over time [, l]awyers, activists, judges, reporters, civic
institutions, and constitutional movements”11 united categories that law keeps separate.
In the campaign against the U.S. Jaycees, public accommodations equality under
state statutes coalesced with federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination in
employment. What was dynamic and synergistic in Roberts was not the Jaycees’
constitutional interests, but rather women’s statutory rights to economic opportunity
and to equal membership.12 The landmark employment protections in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 had become entrenched in legal and popular culture.13 Title VII
intersected with and fueled ordinary women’s entry into civic membership organiza-
tions.14 The public, social movement actors, and eventually the judiciary understood
public accommodations equality as congruent with and central to women’s economic
opportunity and career prospects.15 The link to employment led decision makers to
see the Jaycees as analogous to unions and firms, whose rights to choose their asso-
ciates went unprotected by the First Amendment.16
As Part I describes, within a decade, the public discourse and, governmental and
judicial perspectives shifted from pervasive and unexamined acceptance of a sex-
segregated public to the integration of clubs like the U.S. Jaycees.17 As Part II argues,
a social movement of working women, local Jaycee chapters, and feminist groups con-
nected full membership in civic and commercial organizations to rights to employ-
ment equality.18 Through litigation, media, and advocacy, the link between landmark
employment law protections under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and membership in
Jaycees was cemented.19
As Part III contends, the litigation campaign asserted dual harms in the U.S. Jay-
cees’ treatment of women. First, it represented an affront to fair play, keeping women
from professional and business opportunities. Second, women’s second-class member-
ship maintained their subordination, creating a gender hierarchy within the organization
and contributing to society-wide hierarchies.20 Justice O’Connor’s noted concurrence
and Justice Brennan’s majority opinion respectively adopt these frames.21 Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence best reflects the mainstream understanding of public
11 Zick, supra note 6, at 802; see also id. at 821 (noting that “this synergistic and stereo-
scopic process occurred not only in courthouses, but in the streets, at lunch counters, in
newspapers and other publications, in academic circles, and in homes and workplaces”).
12 See id. at 792–93.
13 Bruce Ackerman has long urged scholars to consider framework federal civil rights
statutes as constructive of American constitutionalism. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3–7 (2014).
14 See Sepper & Dinner, supra note 10, at 100.
15 See id. at 100, 102.
16 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 637–38 (1984).
17 See infra Part I.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text.
492 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:489
accommodations equality as essential to economic opportunity and fair play in the labor
force and of the U.S. Jaycees as primarily commercial.22 While recognizing the link
between employment and Jaycee membership, the majority opinion adds an antisub-
ordination approach, embracing the state’s arguments about the integrated but hi-
erarchical nature of the Jaycees that assigned women to second-class status in the
organization and the business world.23 Although the Jaycees might seem a relic of a
time long past, the social and legal movements leading to the Supreme Court opinion
proves relevant for ongoing debates about the permissibility of segregated organiza-
tions, the emergence of #MeToo, and the tactics of effective movements.24
I. FROM A SEX-SEGREGATED PUBLIC TO ROBERTS V. U.S. JAYCEES
As the 1970s began, 29 million women were in the workforce, but rarely in posi-
tions of power.25 Women were 7.6% of doctors and 4% of attorneys, although those
proportions would soon rise.26 Indeed, “[t]here [were] so few women executives that
when the Harvard Business Review planned to ‘study’ them in 1966, the editors gave
up because ‘there were not enough to study.’”27 Public accommodations reaffirmed
women’s exclusion from and unequal treatment in the labor market.28 As Ruth Bader
Ginsburg wryly noted, when it passed the public accommodations provision of the
Civil Rights Act in 1964, “[a] Congress ready to end the White Café was not pre-
pared to close down the Men’s Grill.”29 Middle-class working women found that their
colleagues, clients, and bosses met to dine and deal in a wide array of restaurants, bars,
athletic centers, and leisure clubs that closed their doors to women.30 Many operated
under the label of “club,” but were in fact open to any man.31 Civic organizations and
professional associations likewise frequently denied women membership.32
22 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 244–52 and accompanying text.
25 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE
LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1, 8 (Dec. 2010), https://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2010
.pdf [https://perma.cc/324X-KSBW].
26 ANN K. BOULIS & JERRY A. JACOBS, THE CHANGING FACE OF MEDICINE: WOMEN DOC-
TORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 42–43 (2008); Cynthia Grant
Bowman, Women in the Legal Profession from the 1920s to the 1970s: What Can We Learn
from Their Experience About Law and Social Change?, 61 ME. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009).
27 Memorandum from Karen DeCrow to Timothy Costello, Vice Chairman, Liberal Party
of N.Y. State 3 (May 9, 1970) (on file with Northwestern University Library, Karen DeCrow
Papers).
28 See generally Sepper & Dinner, supra note 10.
29 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American
Ideal, 6 HUM. RTS. 1, 15 (1976).
30 See Sepper & Dinner, supra note 10, at 80–85.
31 See id. at 87.
32 See id.
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Partly out of concern for economic and political opportunity, the feminist move-
ment drew attention to this pervasive pattern.33 Over the first half of the 1970s, they
convinced state legislators across the country to amend their laws requiring nondis-
crimination in public accommodations—a legal term of art that typically includes any
place open to the public from bakeries to sports clubs.34 By the decade’s end, the
majority of states and cities had added “sex” to these laws.35 Bars, restaurants, and
athletic organizations came to permit women on equal terms.36
Sex-segregated clubs, however, remained a hard target.37 The country had
slowly come around to the idea that membership organizations that welcomed most
of the male public could not—or should not—exclude potential members based on
their religion or race, though the principle remained honored in the breach.38 But the
exclusion of women from clubs was still so accepted as to be ignored or justified by
reference to women’s different interests and men’s privacy concerns.39 In 1975, the
New York City Human Rights Commission, chaired by Eleanor Holmes Norton, found
that the public at large “tended to consider access to club membership a trivial prob-
lem.”40 Government actors also often proved unsympathetic to women’s requests for
access.41 For example, having crossed a line of women journalists picketing the
Gridiron dinner in Washington, which assembled the nation’s most powerful public
figures and media members but excluded women, Justice William O. Douglas
remarked of the Gridiron’s traditions: “They’re covered by the First Amendment.”42
The Junior Chamber of Commerce was symbolic of this struggle. Founded to
advance the business of its members,43 the U.S. Jaycees for decades had offered “a
key to success for the ambitious middle-class young man . . . .”44 It provided members
33 See id. at 101–02.
34 See id. at 103–04.
35 See id. at 104.
36 See id. at 101–04.
37 See id. at 88.
38 E.g., Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 888–89 (1967) (noting that race separation in membership orga-
nizations usually denoted inferiority of black people and has been recognized as invidious).
39 See, e.g., Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1188 (1970) (noting women’s exclusion, but failing to
treat as discriminatory); see also Miller, supra note 38, at 889 (“[S]eparation ordinarily rests
on valid differences in the biological and psychological composition of the two sexes. . . .
Few question the propriety of a men’s club . . . .”).
40 EDITH LYNTON, N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: DIS-
CRIMINATION BY PRIVATE CLUBS 2 (May 1975).
41 See Jeannette Smyth & Abbot Combs, Gridiron Fare, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1972, at B1.
42 Id. at B3. Justice Harry Blackmun also crossed the picket line to attend.
43 N.Y.C. Jaycees, Inc. v. U.S. Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1975).
44 Aaron Epstein, Justices to Rule on Whether States May Force Jaycees to Admit Women,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 1984, at A2.
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leadership training and opportunities, offered awards and incentives for recruitment
and retention of members, and admitted any man eighteen to thirty-five who applied.45
With roughly 300,000 members, the national organization relied on a web of state
and local chapters to consistently recruit and generate dues and programming.46
Women had begun to be invited to join the Jaycees in the 1960s as associate mem-
bers.47 But these memberships explicitly bestowed second-tier status. Associates
could not hold office, receive awards, or vote in an organization that stressed leader-
ship and accolades.48 In the early 1970s chapters in urban areas came to welcome
women to full membership—launching a decade of negotiation, advocacy, and litiga-
tion of local Jaycees versus U.S. Jaycees.49
When the issue of men’s membership clubs reached the Supreme Court in 1984
with Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, clubs—and the Jaycees—remained an important part
of professional life.50 Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun had
been president and member, respectively, of the local Jaycee chapters before the Court
and ultimately did not participate in the decision.51 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—
the first and, at the time, only woman on the Court—raised the issue of recusing her-
self because she belonged to several women-only clubs.52 She was persuaded not to
when it became clear that all the male Justices likewise belonged to single-sex clubs.53
In the end, the Court unanimously upheld the application of Minnesota’s antidis-
crimination law to the U.S. Jaycees and concluded that the organization’s freedom
of association had not been unconstitutionally infringed.54 The Jaycees, the Court
45 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1984).
46 See id.
47 Id. at 613.
48 See id. (explaining the limitations placed on associate members).
49 Id. at 614.
50 See Sepper & Dinner, supra note 10, at 105–06 (noting the importance of professional
clubs and the career opportunities provided by membership).
51 Linder, supra note 9, at 1880. Justice Powell’s conference notes indicate that the Chief Jus-
tice would have affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision at the Court’s April 20, 1984 conference.
See Conference Notes of Justice Powell, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, No. 83-724, Apr. 20, 1984 (on
file with Washington & Lee School of Law Library, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers). But the Chief
Justice subsequently wrote: “[As a Jaycees’ officer] [w]ith some others I advocated that business
and professional women be admitted on the same basis as men. It was an idea whose time had
not arrived. It has now, even though the Minnesota opinion leaves something to be desired.”
Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees (June 12,
1984) (on file with Washington & Lee School of Law Library, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers).
52 Letter from Justice O’Connor to the Conference, Roberts v. Jaycees (Apr. 16, 1984)
(Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers on file with Washington & Lee School of Law Library).
53 Letter from Justice Powell to Justice O’Connor (Apr. 18, 1984) (on file with the
Washington & Lee School of Law Library, Powell Papers) (noting own membership in single-
sex clubs); Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor (Apr. 17, 1984) (same); Letter
from Justice Rehnquist to Justice O’Connor (Apr. 17, 1984) (same).
54 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (noting that the state law “has adopted
2019] SEX SEGREGATION, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND ROBERTS 495
recognized, was a “large and basically unselective group[ ]” and did not qualify as an
intimate association entitled to constitutional protection.55 It lacked the “attributes [of]
relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”56 The
majority concluded that the U.S. Jaycees’ rights to expression and association were at
stake, and thus engaged in strict scrutiny of Minnesota’s law.57 Given the Jaycees’ eco-
nomic and commercial importance, the Court concluded that aims of ensuring women
equality in public life clearly outweighed the organization’s interest in expressive asso-
ciation.58 Having accepted women as associate members, the organization’s goal of
promoting young men’s interests would not be seriously burdened by their full mem-
bership.59 In a noteworthy concurrence, Justice O’Connor instead would have drawn
a line between expressive associations entitled to constitutional shelter for their mem-
bership decisions and commercial associations entitled to none.60 The U.S. Jaycees,
she concluded, easily fell in the latter category.61
The response to the decision was generally positive, The Washington Post re-
ported.62 The Baltimore Sun wrote that the Court took “the commonsense approach
to the meaning of association and privacy”—drawing a line between unselective orga-
nizations like the Jaycees and private, selective associations.63 Other outlets called
Roberts a “bright spot”64 and “one small step for womankind.”65
The day after the decision, the U.S. Jaycees executive committee unanimously
recommended amending its by-laws to admit women in all fifty states.66 At the
annual meeting, not all chapters agreed; some preferred to adopt a genuinely selective
membership process in an attempt to become a bona fide private club permitted to
exclude women (or other groups) under public accommodations law.67 Nonetheless, the
a functional definition of public accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-
commercial conduct”).
55 Id. at 621.
56 Id. at 620.
57 Id. at 623.
58 Id. at 623–29.
59 Id. at 627.
60 See id. at 634 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
61 Id. at 640.
62 Norman D. Atkins & Alma Guillermoprieto, Jaycees Ruling Draws Smiles and Ques-
tions, WASH. POST, July 4, 1984, at A8.
63 Freedom Not to Associate, BALT. SUN, July 16, 1984, at 10A.
64 Robert F. Drinan, High Court Holds Line with a Few Civil Rights Decisions, NAT’L
CATH. REP., July 20, 1984, at 1.
65 One Small Step for Womankind, TIME, Aug. 27, 1984, at 25.
66 Saundra Saperstein, Md. Jaycees Set to Oppose Admission of Female Members, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 1984, at B1.
67 Maryland Jaycees voted to cast all the state’s chapters ballots in support of making
membership more restrictive. Harriet L. Blake, Area Women Now Full-Fledged Jaycees, WASH.
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amendment passed.68 Many members shrugged. An officer of the Oceanside (CA)
Jaycees remarked: “We don’t care if the person has three eyes and 15 toes, so long as
he (or she) will benefit the community . . . . it’s just that until now we were told we
couldn’t have women members.”69 A number of chapter leaders welcomed an antici-
pated boom in membership.70 In a few chapters, men resigned rather than continue with
potentially integrated membership.71 Tommy Todd, the U.S. Jaycees president, adopted
a tone of resigned acceptance: “I think we were moving in that direction anyway . . . .
Our goal for the future is to become America’s greatest young people’s organization.”72
II. THE DYNAMIC PULL OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
How had popular and legal culture shifted so dramatically within a decade? As
this Part explores, through approximately twelve years of media coverage, court liti-
gation and internal debate over women’s status, local Jaycee chapters, ordinary women,
and feminist groups joined equality within membership organizations to economic
opportunity in the workforce. The dynamism of employment and marketplace equality
led the public, and eventually the judiciary, to newly conceptualize the practices of
these men’s organizations as discrimination.73 The tie to the aims of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act—a transformative statute that expressed normative commitment to
workplace equality74—fueled public acceptance of women Jaycees.75 Media cover-
age, litigation, and public advocacy made visible the harms to women from their
subordination in the Jaycees and other membership organizations.
The seeds of this dispute were planted toward the end of the 1960s when the
Jaycees began to admit women as “‘associate’ member[s],” a category open to anyone
from corporate entities to men over thirty-five.76 Particularly in urban areas across
POST, Aug. 30, 1984, at MD10. As a result, three of its local chapters walked out in protest.
Saperstein, supra note 66, at B1.
68 Blake, supra note 67, at MD10.
69 Charles Hillinger & Tom Gorman, Meeting Marks End of Jaycees’ Ban on Women,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1984, at B3.
70 Id.
71 Blake, supra note 67, at MD10.
72 Jaycees Vote to Admit Women to Membership, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1984, at A8.
73 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (recognizing that “the changing
nature of the American economy and if the importance . . . of removing the barriers to
economic advancement and political and social integration that have historically plagued
certain disadvantaged groups, including women”).
74 Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have identified Title VII as a super-
statute, analogous to constitutional amendments. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 10, at 26.
75 Cary Franklin has described the role of “intersectional impacts” in the passage of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968; Congress and proponents of the act focused on the harms to
education and employment from housing discrimination. Cary Franklin, Separate Spheres,
YALE L.J. 2878, 2900–01 (2014).
76 McLellan, supra note 1, at 58.
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the country, male Jaycees invited and recruited working women to join.77 Women
associate members often became quite active in programming, but could not vote,
hold office, or receive the awards that the Jaycees touted.78 In the early 1970s a number
of chapters from New Orleans and Kansas City to Minneapolis and St. Paul, the chap-
ters at issue in Roberts, went further, voting to admit women to regular membership.79
Where it detected these rebellious chapters, the U.S. Jaycees threatened to revoke
their charters.80 In response, some chapters filed suit on the ground that revocation con-
stituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.81 They advanced ambi-
tious theories of state action—arguing that the Jaycees’ extensive use of federal and
state funding, events in government venues, or performance of civic functions
rendered it a public entity subject to constitutional constraints.82 They sometimes won
in the district courts.83 But, by the mid-1970s, just as constitutional doctrine barring sex
discrimination had begun to emerge,84 the Supreme Court brought the brief period of
robust state action doctrine to an end, foreclosing equal protection claims against public
accommodations.85 Each of the local Jaycees’ victories in district court was reversed
when appellate courts found no state action.86 Future litigation would set mere statute
against constitutional right.
The failure of the local Jaycees’ constitutional claims, however, increased public
recognition of the degree to which economic opportunity and men’s clubs intertwined.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 55.
79 Epstein, supra note 44, at A2.
80 Id.
81 Angela Taylor, Women vs. Jaycees: It’s Up to the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1974,
at 48.
82 See id.
83 See, e.g., Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kan. City v. Mo. State Junior Chamber of
Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court order granting preliminary
injunction in favor of local Jaycees based on finding of no state action); N.Y.C. Jaycees, Inc. v.
U.S. Jaycees, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that national Jaycees’ revocation
of local chapter’s charter constituted state action and its sex discrimination violated the Fifth
Amendment). But see Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. U.S. Jaycees, 495 F.2d
883 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (affirming district court’s dismissal
due to no state action).
84 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (rejecting sex classifi-
cation in the award of military benefits). A majority of the Court would first apply intermediate
scrutiny to sex. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976).
85 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176–77 (1972) (requiring that the
state “foster or encourage racial discrimination” or be “a partner or even a joint venturer in
the club’s enterprise” in order to find state action); Millenson v. New Hotel Monteleone, Inc.,
475 F.2d 736, 737 (5th Cir. 1973) (relying on Moose Lodge to reject equal protection claim
against a hotel’s sex-discriminatory policy filed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the ACLU).
86 See, e.g., Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kan. City, 508 F.2d 1031 (finding no state
action); Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, 495 F.2d 883 (same); N.Y.C. Jaycees,
512 F.2d 856.
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The head of the Rochester Jaycees, which mounted one of the lawsuits, explained that
less than full membership denied women advantages of management training and
prestige.87 “Business and Government leaders look for rising young leaders” within
the ranks of the Jaycees, he said.88 “If women cannot be members, they are denied
this chance to be noticed.”89 The president of the newly integrated Boston Jaycees ob-
served, “corporate doors open when you say you’re from the Boston Jaycees.”90
Women seeking to fully participate in these organizations made mainstream the
understanding of Jaycees membership as commercial rather than social.91 Major
newspapers profiled the women in integrated chapters.92 One subject of the legal
battle—Avia Kinard, a black twenty-seven-year-old nurse—had been elected the first
vice president of the Jaycees chapter when it integrated, having previously served as
president of the New York City Jaycettes (the Jaycees’ women’s auxiliary).93 Another
member, a manager at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Linda
Valente—described as “dark haired, miniskirted and 26”—valued the training: “You
learn to run a meeting and express yourself clearly.”94 These women frequently denied
having any feminist tendencies,95 but insisted, as the first female president of the
Massachusetts Jaycees, Sally Funk, put it, that “[u]nder age 35, there isn’t a company
around to give you the gamut of experience you get in Jaycees.”96
Local membership organizations and women seeking to join them began to, as
Douglas NeJaime calls it, win through losing.97 Court battles generated publicity and
87 Taylor, supra note 81.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Brief for Minn. State Chapter Nat’l Org. for Women as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lant at 30, U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (No. 51171) (internal refer-
ence and quotation omitted) [hereinafter NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme Court].
91 Id. at 2 (explaining how organizations, like the Jaycees, are “places for profitable
exchange”).
92 See Taylor, supra note 81.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Edward De Angelo, Chorus of Protest Surfaces over Jaycees’ Ban on Women, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 13, 1979, at 37A (describing Bev Bedard of Willimantic, a business owner
who did a lot of work for local Jaycees and wanted to join but “[didn’t] consider herself a
feminist by any means”); Bert Mann, Women’s Appeal for Membership Shakes Jaycees, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1975, at SG2 (quoting applicant to Pasadena Jaycees as saying “I am not a
women’s libber”); Miss Hipple Is Headed for History as President of Jaycees, BALT. SUN,
Sept. 28, 1976, at B2 (describing Margi Hipple who joined Philadelphia Jaycees in 1972 and
became president in 1976 but “[didn’t] regard herself as a gung-ho feminist”).
96 Scott Armstrong, Don’t Count the Women Out of Jaycees Yet, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 18, 1978, at 1 (internal citations omitted).
97 Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 959 (2011) (“Litiga-
tion loss shapes advocates’ strategies. . . . [T]hey cultivate the loss to advance the complex
process of reform.”).
2019] SEX SEGREGATION, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND ROBERTS 499
garnered sympathy for women marginalized in the clubs that shaped economic and
civic life. With the defeat of their equal protection claims, women and feminist orga-
nizations funneled energies into other strategies.98 They pressured city and state officials
to drop their memberships at men-only clubs.99 Governmental employers barred par-
ticipation of personnel in meetings at exclusionary locales—still common practice
into the 1980s.100 Some employers stopped paying employee dues and professional
organizations pulled events.101 By the date of the Roberts decision, the federal govern-
ment prohibited federal contractors from paying dues for discriminatory club member-
ships for employees.102 While these efforts made clubs less attractive as business
places for men, they also provided evidence of the commercial function of member-
ship organizations.103 These extrajudicial strategies transformed the normative context
in which the Jaycees issue would reach the Court.
The litigation also showcases the role of constitutional and statutory claims in
prompting and sustaining intraorganizational negotiations. As the equal protection liti-
gation came to an end, local chapters achieved a brief détente with the national organi-
zation. The 1975 U.S. Jaycees president defanged sanctions and permitted chapters to
retain their affiliation in return for agreeing not to vote at the national meetings or to run
members for national office.104 Even as the U.S. Jaycees voted against women’s regular
membership in 1975, it also launched a three-year pilot program that allowed chapters
in Massachusetts, Alaska, and D.C. to admit women to full membership.105 For chapters
outside of pilot program states, the U.S. Jaycees Membership Study Committee sug-
gested a “holding company” option, whereby women became members of a holding
company, male Jaycees were affiliates, and all could participate as full equals.106
98 Armstrong, supra note 96 (explaining that women began to lay the groundwork for
fundraising, lobbying, and legal action).
99 See id.
100 Brief for Nat’l Org. for Women, Minn. State Chapter as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at x, U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1493-MN)
[hereinafter NOW Amicus Brief to Eighth Circuit] (on file with the Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, NOW LDEF Papers) (citing federal personnel manual,
memorandum from the Government of New York, and Philadelphia Code barring meetings
at and funding for sex discriminatory facilities).
101 Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, American University Commencement Address, May 10,
1981, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 891, 896 (1981) (noting ABA and major law firms “have avoided
conducting official business, holding dinners or luncheons, or providing lodging for guests
at Clubs that exclude, mindless of individual merit, and solely on the basis of race, religion,
national origin, or sex”).
102 NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 3.
103 See id. at 34–35.
104 McLellan, supra note 1, at 59.
105 Mary Jane Fine, Old Ways Prevail as Mail Line Jaycees Jilt Woman, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Jan. 1, 1983, at B1.
106 See, e.g., U.S. Jaycees v. Superior Court of Santa Clara, 195 Cal. Rptr. 517, 518 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983).
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Many chapters used this workaround.107 This flexibility permitted continued conver-
sations about reform and seemed to promise incremental change within the national
organization.
Inclusion of integrated chapters under the umbrella of U.S. Jaycees also changed
the image of who a Jaycee was. By 1978, somewhere between 150 and 300 chapters—
in big cities in particular—invited women as full members.108 In addition to the pilot
program and holding company option, other chapters integrated surreptitiously and
escaped scrutiny by designating members in their rolls by a first initial and last name.109
Women joined and became leaders.110
Women’s Jaycees membership and their professional success built on one another.
The 1970s and ’80s saw a transformation of women’s workforce participation. En-
forcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the enactment of Title IX of the
Education Amendments drove women’s entry into professional schools and higher-
status jobs.111 Between 1972 and 1985, women’s share of professional jobs doubled.112
The passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 aided women to start
businesses and secure loans.113 As more women joined the ranks of business, more
women were qualified for and sought to join the Jaycees.114 This phenomenon also
meant civic and fraternal organizations needed women to ensure adequate member-
ship, especially in urban areas where women had achieved a measure of success.115
Local chapter leaders and media began to perceive the integration of the Jaycees as
107 Janice Mall, About Women: Jaycees Vote to Keep Women Out—Again, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1978, at G14.
108 Id. (noting existence of women Jaycees in Des Moines, Minneapolis, Louisville,
Pittsburgh, Atlanta, and San Francisco); Ewart Rouse, To the U.S. Jaycees, She’s a Trouble-
maker, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 17, 1978, at 20J (noting at least ten “rebellious” chapters in
New Jersey and an estimated 150 to 300 nationwide).
109 One Small Step for Womankind, supra note 65, at 25.
110 Mall, supra note 107, at G14 (reporting that Massachusetts saw major growth under
the pilot going from the fortieth to the thirteenth largest organization).
111 BOULIS & JACOBS, supra note 26, at 25 (“In the late 1960s and early 1970s, activists
from the feminist and civil rights movements were working collaboratively, lobbying
Congress and suing public institutions to address discrimination against women and mi-
norities, including those applying to medical school.”); see id. at 26 (“Between 1970 and
1974, two years after passage of Title IX, the number of women applicants to medical school
more than tripled . . . .”).
112 George Guilder, Women in the Work Force, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1986, https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/1986/09/women-in-the-work-force/304924/ [https://perma
.cc/8F5S-ZNXD] (women’s share of management and banking/finance jobs went from 20
to 36% and from 9 to 39%, respectively).
113 See Courtney G. Joslin, Discrimination in and out of Marriage, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1, 22
(2018) (exploring the advocacy for the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974).
114 De Angelo, supra note 95, at 3719.
115 See McLellan, supra note 1, at 58 (reporting that urban chapters struggling with
membership in the early 1970s were bolstered due to women’s membership).
2019] SEX SEGREGATION, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND ROBERTS 501
“logical”116 and fair. One proponent said his chapter’s decision to give young women
awards previously reserved for “outstanding young men” was “not a matter of equal
rights, . . . but of giving due credit where people deserve it.”117 The Jaycees were
attractive to working women because, although women had always been involved
in community service, the Jaycees were “more professionally relevant,” a place “where
one could polish business know-how and develop the social skills Dale Carnegie so cor-
rectly associated with business success.”118 In turn, women’s membership in the Jaycees
advanced their professional lives and made Jaycees more appealing to other women.119
As women climbed the career ladder, the public and Jaycees leadership seemed to
take women’s eventual full membership as inevitable. More than a decade before
Roberts, U.S. Jaycees’ then-president, Samuel D. Winter, said women should be admit-
ted to full membership.120 In 1975, even as the organization voted against women’s
full status, its spokesperson predicted that, “Eventually, women may come to be Jaycees
members . . . .”121 According to U.S. Jaycees’ officials, opposition to women’s
membership was “not on chauvinist grounds,”122 but “mostly for inertial reasons.”123
The turn from the 1970s to 1980s, however, saw a retrenchment on women’s
membership.124 Conservatives took the helm of the national organization.125 In 1978,
U.S. Jaycees again voted against women’s full membership.126 Barry Kennedy, the
newly elected president, ended the pilot program and announced that women had to
be purged from full member rolls and reinscribed as associates.127 The 1980 president,
116 Hartford Jaycees Open Door for Women Members, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 5,
1973, at 24 (“Surely, logical is the correct word to use in view of the excellent qualifications
of many women now in the fields of business and the professions.”).
117 Gloria Negri, Janet Murphy Moves Among the Lawmakers, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 26,
1973, at 19.
118 McLellan, supra note 1, at 58.
119 Id.
120 Jaycees May Admit Women, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1973, at 13. The press reported that
“[w]hatever the decision may be in 1973, in time women are sure to be welcomed on equal
terms, if only because that is the trend of our time in all areas.” Hartford Jaycees Open Door
for Women Members, supra note 116, at 24.
121 No Women Members, Jaycees Say 3 Times, GLOBE & MAIL, June 27, 1975, at 11.
122 James F. Clarity, Jaycees Retain Ban on Women Members: National Meeting Over-
whelmingly Votes Against Allowing Full Participation by Females, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1978, at A20; see also Nicholas C. Chriss, Ban on Women Members Splits Jaycees: Urban-
Rural Schism Deepens with Dec. 1 Confrontation Looming, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1978, at E1
(indicating that the quote came from Jaycees’ headquarters).
123 Lawrence Feinberg, Annapolis Jaycee Chapter Punished on Women Issue, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 1975, at A8.
124 See McLellan, supra note 1, at 54.
125 See id.
126 Of course, the chapters that had admitted women were under sanction and could not
vote. Id. at 60.
127 Id. at 54.
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J. Terryl Bechtol, subsequently repudiated the holding company option, resulting in
the disaffiliation of major chapters.128
Chapters in D.C., Massachusetts, Alaska, and Minnesota, where Roberts originated,
were threatened with revocation of their charters and the right to use the Jaycees’
name.129 Blindsided by the decision to demote women members, they turned to public
accommodations law to preserve their integrated membership.130 By that time, the
majority of states and cities had added “sex” to their laws prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodation.131 In each case, the fact-finder determined the U.S. Jaycees
to be a public accommodation, actively recruiting and accepting all male applicants and
providing leadership opportunities to the male public in exchange for dues—only
to be reversed.132
Conservative leaders in the late 1970s took the success of their defenses against
equal protection claims as a signal they were in the right, politically and legally.133
Consistent with theories that movement actors bring legal norms to bear outside
courts,134 conservative Jaycees employed judicial decisions in their favor to affect
the internal deliberations of the organization. One report, for example, attributed the
1975 vote against women’s full membership to the organization’s “flush” of victory
in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected local chapters’ constitutional
claims.135 The constitutional decisions emboldened resistance to women’s member-
ship as intraorganizational debate continued. Proposals of a local option permitting
individual chapters to decide the issue died.136 Rather than negotiate internally, U.S.
Jaycees began to pursue trademark infringement claims against local chapters.137
And, after the public accommodations lawsuits proceeded, the organization’s in-
house lawyer, Carl Hall, repeatedly cited the these rulings on state action as proof
128 See id.; see also U.S. Jaycees v. Superior Court of Santa Clara, 195 Cal. Rptr. 517,
518–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
129 See McLellan, supra note 1, at 55–57, 59.
130 See, e.g., U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Minn. 1981) (noting that the
litigation originated with the St. Paul and Minneapolis chapters filing public accommodations
complaints in 1978 against the National Chapter, which had threatened their charters).
131 Sepper & Dinner, supra note 10, at 104.
132 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1561 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)
(collecting sources articulating that the Jaycees are public accommodations). But see U.S.
Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379, 1381 (D.C. 1981) (holding that a Jaycees chapter “is
not a place of public accommodation”).
133 See Mall, supra note 107, at G14.
134 See generally Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
135 Mall, supra note 107, at G14.
136 See McLellan, supra note 1, at 54.
137 See, e.g., U. S. Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 490 F. Supp. 688, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1979); U.S.
Jaycees v. Superior Court of Santa Clara, 195 Cal. Rptr. 518, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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that the organization was not public and was free to deny women membership for
purposes of public accommodation law—a distinctly different legal issue.138
The political economy of the late 1970s and early 1980s helped fuel this opposi-
tion. Conflicts between the Jaycees organizational membership resulted from a rural-
urban schism.139 As a 1978 U.S. Jaycees white paper acknowledged, in metro areas
“men and women of Jaycee age interact and compete in the business world on a
daily basis”—and wanted to work as equals in the Jaycees.140 Resistance came from
“small-town, conservative middle America, places where women tend to have low-
level jobs.”141 Those chapters least likely to have qualified women applicants thus
were most fearful of sex integration.142
Conservative Jaycee leaders saw the election of Ronald Reagan as president in
1980 as an endorsement of their position. J. Terryl Bechtol, then–U.S. Jaycees president
insisted, “If we stop right now and vote female membership in, . . . U.S. Jaycee leader-
ship would be taking this organization totally out of step with the way the country
is going. . . . We’re back to the point where people are saying the Jaycees are right. . . .
They didn’t use to say that.”143 The unification of the anti-feminist Religious Right
and the libertarian New Right, and their effectiveness in electing President Reagan,
signaled social and political resistance to an overbearing government.144 Bechtol
expected that his conservatism would be vindicated in short order in litigation wins
and social acceptance.145 As the public accommodations litigation proceeded, the
Jaycees’ leadership rejected offers to settle for a local option and determined to fight
all the way to the top.146
III. THE LITIGATION OF ROBERTS V. U.S. JAYCEES
Roberts v. Jaycees originated when the U.S. Jaycees threatened the St. Paul and
Minneapolis chapters with imminent charter revocation in December of 1978.147 The
138 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 772 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting this argument
and the distinction between the two questions).
139 Fine, supra note 105, at B1 (noting that over the last decade Jaycees have shrunk in
metro areas and grown in rural and more conservative areas); Mall, supra note 107, at G14
(Los Angeles chapter president noting that differences between big cities and small towns
is real divide).
140 Clarity, supra note 122, at A20.
141 See Mall, supra note 107, at G14.
142 See id.
143 McLellan, supra note 1, at 58.
144 See KEVIN M. KRUSE & JULIAN E. ZELIZER, FAULT LINES: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 1974, at 88–100 (2019) (describing the rise of religious right and new right
and their embrace of Ronald Reagan as their messenger).
145 See McLellan, supra note 1, at 54–55.
146 See id. at 58.
147 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 609 (1984).
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chapters and some women Jaycees filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department
of Human Rights, alleging that the U.S. Jaycees was a public accommodation dis-
criminating against women in the goods, privileges, and advantages it offered the
public.148 This case quickly became more high profile than those in other states,
because it involved the state attorney general, resulted in a ruling from the state
supreme court, and quickly brought constitutional claims front and center.149
Given the importance of the case, the Office of the Attorney General solicited the
involvement of the National Organization for Women (NOW) as amicus.150 Founded
in 1966 as an “NAACP for women,” NOW listed among its leaders and founders
civil rights lawyer Pauli Murray and author Betty Friedan.151 Its members, who were
primarily white and middle class, had lobbied and litigated nationwide against sex
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, credit, and beyond.152 NOW
had a particular interest in the private men’s clubs that held back women’s profes-
sional careers and it had been involved in softer efforts to press Jaycees toward
voluntary cessation of its exclusion of women since the early 1970s.153 NOW, the
state hoped, would provide “insight into the importance of early ‘contacts’ and en-
trance to the ‘old boy’ network” and bring to the courts’ attention “evidence that the
exclusion of women from this infrastructure reinforces stereotypical notions as to
their inferiority.”154
Minnesota and women’s groups took a two-pronged approach typical of the
litigation against the Jaycees. First, as Section A argues, they conceptualized of the
Jaycees’ policies as an impediment to fair play in the labor market. Second, as Section
148 Id.
149 See id. at 611–12, 616.
150 Letter from Richard L. Varco, Jr., Special Assistant Minn. Att’y Gen., to Phyllis Segal,
NOW Legal Def. & Educ. Fund (Mar. 31, 1980) [hereinafter Letter from Richard L. Varco,
Jr.] (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, NOW
LDEF Papers).
151 Carol Giardina, MOW to NOW: Black Feminism Resets the Chronology of the
Founding of Modern Feminism, 44 FEMINIST STUD. 736, 737, 753 (2018); see also DOROTHY
SUE COBBLE ET AL., FEMINISM UNFINISHED: A SHORT SURPRISING HISTORY OF AMERICAN
WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS 61 (2014) (describing NOW as the “NAACP for women”).
152 See generally KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON TRIAL: GENDER AND RIGHTS IN THE
MODERN AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2016) (describing legal campaigns with regard to women’s
employment); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Con-
struction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (2011) (discussing NOW’s role
in Title VII enforcement and protections for maternity and pregnancy); Sepper & Dinner,
supra note 10 (documenting the campaign against sex discrimination in public accommodations
during the 1970s).
153 See, e.g., Letter from Wilma Scott Heide, President NOW, to Von Kerik, President
Tulsa NOW (Feb. 14, 1974) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University, Wilma Heide Scott Papers) (noting attempts to meet with U.S. Jaycees’ leadership
to counter women’s subordination).
154 Letter from Richard L. Varco, Jr., supra note 150, at 2.
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B contends, women’s second-class status maintained a gender hierarchy both within
the organization and the workforce.155
More pragmatist than idealist, they advanced arguments for what Professor Robert
Tsai, another participant in this Symposium, calls practical equality.156 Exclusion from
full membership was problematic because it impaired women’s careers and relegated
them to a marginal and lesser role.157 This long campaign largely portrayed the Jaycees,
not as ill-intentioned wrongdoers, but as part of a structural problem, rooted in and
adding to employment inequality and society-wide hierarchy.158 As this strategy
suggests, the state decentered some of the parallels to race segregation that other
actors (like the NAACP) subsequently would press.159 This strategy effectively avoided
discussions of the U.S. Jaycees’ intent or animus and instead allowed for scrutiniz-
ing the structural dimensions of the organization and the hierarchy it maintained.
Both the economic aspect and the subordinating function of the Jaycees proved
determinative to court decisions in favor of women’s full Jaycees membership. Con-
nected to labor participation and promotion, Jaycees invited comparisons to hiring
firms and unions—whose associational interests must cede to equal status for minori-
ties.160 The economic aspects of the Jaycees made evident the harms of its two-tiered
membership structure.161 Unlike male full members, female associate members could
not vote, hold office or directorship, or receive the awards that bestowed community
and employer recognition.162 They were subordinated as second-class Jaycees.
A. The Confluence of Membership in the Club and Opportunity in Employment
As in the court of public opinion, litigation against the U.S. Jaycees took the
position that public accommodations equality could not be isolated from other goals.
The state of Minnesota pointed to women’s increasing labor outside the home as an
advance that depended on their access to “the organizational and leadership skills
155 NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 2, 5.
156 ROBERT TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION 7–8
(2019) (arguing that fair play or rationality can act as effective substitutes for more inherently
judgmental assertions of equality).
157 NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 2, 5.
158 See TSAI, supra note 156, at 18–19 (arguing that a focus on fair play and rationality
avoids finger-pointing and the identification of, and offense to, a wrongdoer).
159 In her work on the Jaycees, Linda McClain argues that the question of whether the
discrimination was of an invidious nature of the discrimination brought analogies between
race and sex front and center in briefs by parties and amici to the Supreme Court. Linda C.
McClain, “‘Male Chauvinism’ is Under Attack from All Sides at Present”: Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, Sex Discrimination, and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2385,
2388–89 (2019). In the longer movement for Jaycees integration, however, the analogy to
race, though present in the briefs, was marginal or tertiary.
160 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 637–38 (1984).
161 See Taylor, supra note 81, at 48.
162 See McLellan, supra note 1, at 55.
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which they can obtain from equal participation in the U.S. Jaycees.”163 Minnesota
and its amici reminded the courts that the Jaycees’ impact on business development
and career success was not subtle. As NOW noted, benefits accrued to employers
in the form of outsourcing of management skill training and publicity for awards for
public service.164 In a market where almost one-third of jobs held by men, and an
even higher share of high-status jobs, came through personal contacts,165 individuals
gained “a network of upwardly mobile peers and access to the business and civic lead-
ers of the community”166 through the Jaycees. Jaycees chapter presidents sometimes
sat on the chamber of commerce ex officio.167 The Jaycees advertised that the annual
dues of $25 would be more than made up by the $25/month increase in salary that
members gained through its programs.168 Many employers paid dues and recommended
that their employees join the Jaycees.169 Women’s full membership in the Jaycees ad-
vanced their statutory right to economic opportunity and labor market participation.
As Minnesota and its amici saw the case, the commitment to equality expressed by
federal and state civil rights law should inform constitutional interpretation. The con-
struction of the public accommodations law sought by the Jaycees, the state warned,
would stymie progress in employment, “grat[ing] harshly against the grain” of the state
civil rights act as a whole.170 Its approach reflected the increasing recognition among
government actors that, while “not as crippling perhaps as exclusion from higher ed-
ucation or skilled work,” exclusionary clubs worked to “threaten public policy barring
job discrimination today.”171 The state urged courts to interpret the Jaycees’ constitu-
tional freedom of association with sensitivity to the statutory and cultural commitments
of the time.172
In its defense, the U.S. Jaycees asserted a sort of half constitutional right.173 Prior
precedent treated freedom of association as a mechanism to advance other constitu-
tional rights—rights to petition, expression, exercise religion, make decisions about
163 Respondent’s Brief on Certified Issue at 19, U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1981) (No. 51171) [hereinafter Brief on Certified Issue] (on file with the Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, NOW LDEF Papers).
164 NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 4–5.
165 Id. at 22–23 (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics bulletin).
166 Id. at 21.
167 Id. at 27–28 (noting that the St. Paul chapter president did so).
168 Id. at 14 (quoting Jaycees recruitment manual).
169 See also Samuel Rabinove, Clubs Under Siege, SKANNER (Portland, Or.), Aug. 5, 1981,
at 10 (reporting national survey of 700 banks in 1980 that found that 419 of them regularly
paid for employee dues to private clubs); Taylor, supra note 81, at 48 (“Corporations usually
encourage membership and some pay the members’ dues.”).
170 Brief on Certified Issue, supra note 163, at 19.
171 LYNTON, supra note 40, at 3, 7; see also NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme
Court, supra note 90.
172 Brief on Certified Issue, supra note 163, at 17.
173 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 609 (1984).
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family, and pursue intimate relationships.174 As a “cumulative,” “aggregate,” or “dy-
namic” right, association required a link to privacy or speech.175 The question of
whether a membership organization like the Jaycees fell within the definition of a
public accommodation under the state statute was a genuinely difficult one.176 But
that question was for the Minnesota Supreme Court and had been answered in the
affirmative.177 By contrast, the Jaycees’ constitutional claim seemed weak.178
The Jaycees’ organizational form belied intimacy or privacy. Unlike bona fide
private clubs—a category into which many selective, exclusive, relatively small men’s
clubs fell—Jaycees was, in Justice O’Connor’s words, “not ‘private’ in any mean-
ingful sense of that term.”179 With approximately 300,000 members, it recruited
strangers through door-to-door solicitations and television ads and had never turned
away an applicant.180 The commercial nature of the Jaycees made its claim of being
an expressive association like the NAACP less than convincing.181
As the case wound through administrative bodies and state and federal courts,
the heft of women’s interests in economic opportunity made the U.S. Jaycees’
freedom to exclude appear flimsy.182 Fact-finders in Minnesota were convinced of
the outsized commercial and economic aspects of the Jaycees.183 The human rights
examiner interpreted the public accommodations provision through the lens of em-
ployment discrimination statutes: “It would make little sense to guarantee women an
equal opportunity in employment while denying them access to activities designed
174 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (characterizing freedom of asso-
ciation as stemming from the “close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly”).
175 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1324–43 (2017); Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1080 (2016); Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law,
122 YALE L.J. 2, 48–55 (2012). Before the Eighth Circuit, Minnesota made this argument:
“[F]reedom of association is a derivative right which protects the enumerated first amendment
rights of speech, press, petition, and assembly, as well as the judicially recognized right of
privacy. It is not an independent constitutional right.” Brief of Appellees Marilyn E. McClure
et al. at 8, U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1493-MN)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellees Marilyn E. McClure et. al] (on file with the Mudd Library,
Princeton University, American Civil Liberty Union Papers).
176 See generally U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (struggling to
come to terms with various questions involved in this case).
177 Id. at 765.
178 See id. (ruling the United States Jaycees a place of public accommodation).
179 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
180 See id. at 621 (majority opinion).
181 Id. at 620–21.
182 See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L.
REV. 68, 74 (1986) (“While the associational rights of the Jaycees were considered to be
virtually nonexistent, the state interests were found to be particularly weighty because of the
social and business prominence of the Jaycees organization.”).
183 See U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1555–65 (8th Cir. 1983).
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to help in career advancement.”184 The Supreme Court of Minnesota then sided with
the state on the issue of whether the Jaycees was a public accommodation, conclud-
ing that the Jaycees promised and sold to men business contacts and employment
promotions.185
As courts took up the Jaycees’ constitutional defense, they saw state statute and
federal civil rights protections as interrelated and interdependent. Having secured
favorable rulings in state adjudication, the state at first prevailed on the constitu-
tional issue. District Judge Diana Murphy concluded that the state’s interest in sex
equality outweighed any associational right on the part of the U.S. Jaycees.186 Her
opinion made explicit the ways in which legal and social commitment to the Civil
Rights Act primed the adjudication of the men’s club issue.187 The passage of Title
VII—she said—lent support to seeing the state’s interest in ending sex discrimina-
tion in public accommodations as compelling.188 Judge Murphy drew an analogy to
a recent district court case applying Title VII to a law firm partnership’s decisions
and rejecting defenses based on freedom of association.189 She perceived the federal
Civil Rights Act and the state public accommodation law as fostering a shared
vision of a sex-egalitarian marketplace (notwithstanding the fact that the public
accommodation title of the Civil Rights Act did not reach sex discrimination).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the applica-
tion of public accommodation law violated U.S. Jaycees’ freedom of association.190
But the court indicated that it might uphold a statute that instead forbade member-
ship discrimination in “groups of more than a certain size that derived a substantial
amount of support from business.”191 It also agreed that a sufficiently developed
record of significant connection to business opportunity would remove a member-
ship organization from the protection of the First Amendment.192
At the Supreme Court, the combined weight of economic opportunity and member-
ship organization equality again tipped the scales in favor of the female Jaycees.193
184 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, McClure v. U.S. Jaycees, No. 1800-
7802, 1979 WL 61037, *15 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs.) (Oct. 9, 1979) [hereinafter Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order]. He further noted that the big business nature of the
organization might distinguish it from others. Id. at *18.
185 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1981).
186 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Minn. 1982).
187 See id. at 771–72.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 772.
190 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1576 (8th Cir. 1983).
191 Id. at 1573.
192 Id. at 1576 (further indicating that it might uphold a statute that forbade membership
discrimination in “groups of more than a certain size that derived a substantial amount of
support from business”).
193 See generally Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Like the Eighth Circuit, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, determined the
U.S. Jaycees amounted to an expressive association.194 But, unlike the lower court,
he credited the Jaycees’ commercial and marketplace function. In a nod to the direct
relationship between employment and membership organizations, the Court noted
“the changing nature of the American economy” and the role of public accommoda-
tions law in “removing the barriers to economic advancement.”195 The Court con-
cluded that assuring women access to the leadership skills, business contacts, and
employment promotions promised by the U.S. Jaycees clearly furthered compelling
state interests.196
It is Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, however, that best captures the social and
legal moment and its recognition of men’s clubs as, alternately, gateways or barriers
to economic opportunity.197 She chided the majority for adopting “a test that unad-
visedly casts doubt on the power of States to pursue the profoundly important goal
of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society”
and that insufficiently safeguards associations engaged predominantly in protected
expression.198 While “an association engaged exclusively in protected expression”
enjoys wide-ranging First Amendment protections to select its membership and
discriminate, a commercial association retains “only minimal constitutional protec-
tion” in this regard.199 She said forthrightly: “An association must choose its market.
Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the
complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined
its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”200 O’Connor determined that Jaycees was
decidedly on the commercial side, reflecting little expressive value.201
Like Judge Murphy, Justice O’Connor analogized the case to Title VII claims
against employers and unions, another institution mediating labor force promotion.202
She reminded the Court that just six weeks prior, the Court had “readily rejected a
large commercial law firm’s claim to First Amendment protection for alleged gender-
based discriminatory partnership decisions for associates of the firm.”203 Like the law
firm, the Jaycees posed “a relatively easy case.”204 The organization, O’Connor wrote,
194 Id. at 622.
195 Id. at 626.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 632, 640 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
198 Id. at 632.
199 Id. at 633–34.
200 Id. at 636.
201 Id. at 638–40.
202 Id. at 637–38 (citing Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945) (holding that a
labor union could not assert a right to choose its membership contrary to state employment
discrimination law)).
203 Id. at 637 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
204 Id. at 638.
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“is, first and foremost, an organization that, at both the national and local levels,
promotes and practices the art of solicitation and management.”205 Title VII applied
to the glass ceilings on women’s progress within firms without raising constitutional
concerns. So too could the public accommodation statute apply to Jaycees’ economi-
cally significant exclusionary policies without First Amendment scrutiny.
B. An Antisubordinating First Amendment
While Justice O’Connor’s concurrence embraced the substantial connection
between employment and Jaycees membership, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion
added a distinctly antisubordinating approach to the First Amendment.206 His opin-
ion for the Court emphasized both the second-class status of women within the
organization and its impact on gender hierarchy within society.207 Although the anti-
subordinating aspects of the case are often overlooked, Professor Susan Appleton has
recognized that the real issue was a right to preserve “gender hierarchy,” not to ex-
clude women from the association.208
From the moment of the filing of the complaint, Minnesota explicitly characterized
the case as about subordination of women.209 It requested that the hearing examiner
restrain Jaycees from “treating its female members in an inferior, second class man-
ner.”210 The state argued that “[i]t would belabor the obvious to more than note that
the role to which women are relegated solely because of their sex within the Jaycees
organization is both subordinate and inferior to that assigned men.”211 At the time the
litigation began, the antisubordination theory of equal protection had been articulated
205 Id. at 639.
206 See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2119–20 (2018) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “context-sensitive, substantive-
equality-promoting view of the First Amendment” until the 1970s).
207 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
208 Susan Frelich Appleton, Liberty’s Forgotten Refugees? Engendering Assembly, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 1423, 1432 (2012).
209 McClure v. U.S. Jaycees, No. 1800-7802, 1979 WL 61037 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs.
Oct. 9, 1979) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University,
NOW LDEF Papers); Complainant’s Brief at 2, 9–10, McClure v. U.S. Jaycees, No. 1800-7802,
1979 WL 61037, *18 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs. Oct. 9, 1979) [hereinafter Minn. Complainant’s
Brief Before Hum. Rights Exam’r] (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University, NOW LDEF Papers).
210 Minn. Complainant’s Brief Before Hum. Rights Exam’r, supra note 209, at 9.
211 Id. at 2. A “minor but nonetheless striking example of this disparity” the state noted
was Jaycees national headquarters is an office building, the Jaycettes’ the “current president’s
home.” Id. at 2 n.3.; see also Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, U.S. Jaycees v. McClure,
709 F.2d 1560, 1583 (8th Cir. 1983) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University, NOW LDEF Papers) (noting that at issue were policies that “relegated
[women] to the subordinate status of Associate”); NOW Amicus Brief to Eighth Circuit,
supra note 100, at 19 (noting that Jaycees had chosen “to associate with women but to dis-
criminate against them by offering an inferior membership status”).
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only recently, with Owen Fiss’s groundbreaking 1976 article.212 Fiss argued for an
anti–“group disadvantaging” view of equal protection that would oppose caste and
find “it undesirable for any social group to occupy a position of subordination for
an extended period of time.”213 Phrased in the language of equal citizenship, anti-
caste, and antisubordination, these theories advanced a vision of equality that required
attacking those social structures that maintained an underclass of historically
oppressed.214 Contrary to claims made by some scholars,215 the state, local Jaycees,
and amici denominated the U.S. Jaycees policy as discriminatory because it reflected
and inscribed the “longstanding societal practice whereby women, solely by acci-
dent of birth, are relegated to inferior positions in the social and economic order.”216
Second-class membership reinscribed hierarchies in employment, society, and family.
The men’s club issue seemed to present the Court with a tension between an in-
dividual’s statutory right to equal access and the organization’s constitutional freedom
of association premised on the ability to exclude others. In advancing a right of asso-
ciation, Jaycees had argued that the antidiscrimination law would “compel the qualified
members of Jaycees to accept an unwanted personal relationship with women as peers
and companions in the decision-making processes of the organization.”217 The Eighth
Circuit panel to hear the case determined: “It is natural to expect that an association
containing both men and women will not be so single-minded about advancing
men’s interests as an association of men only. . . . An organization of young people,
as opposed to young men . . . will be substantially different . . . .”218 As Professor
Linda McClain argues, whether the Jaycees’ right to expressive association would
be impaired through women’s membership depended on whether it “was truly a
212 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976). For other theorists predating the Roberts decision, see CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117–18 (1979) (encouraging courts to consider
“whether the policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an
underclass or a deprived position because of gender status”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1052 (1978) (emphasizing the need to dismantle subordi-
nating social structures).
213 Fiss, supra note 212, at 151.
214 See Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Reme-
dies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1668 (1991)
(“Sexist men do not, as a general rule, try to avoid all contact with women. On the contrary,
they desire contact in certain subordinating forms, such as having women as secretaries and
dependent wives.”).
215 See John D. Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (2012)
(“I had not characterized the Jaycees’s practices as subordinating (nor, for that matter, did the
Court or any of the litigants), but Professor Appleton makes a good argument for construing
the case in this way.”).
216 Brief on Certified Issue, supra note 163, at 17.
217 Reply Brief of Appellant the U.S. Jaycees at 2, U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d
1560 (8th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1493-MN) (on file with the Mudd Library, Princeton University,
American Civil Liberty Union Papers).
218 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571 (8th Cir. 1983).
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‘men’s organization’ with purposes unique to the advancement of young men’s
interests and rooted in ideas about gender difference and the desire for all-male or
all-female associations.”219
The facts, however, belied the U.S. Jaycees’ claimed freedom to associate on an
exclusive basis.220 At the working level, men and women already participated in
planning and program implementation with no distinction between individual and
associate members.221 But women were denied leadership opportunities in their local,
state, and national chapters, voting at the national level, and recognition through the
awards that characterized the Jaycees.222
The U.S. Jaycees’ two-tiered structure created—NOW argued—“a ‘together but
unequal’ environment with many serious disadvantages to the second-class partici-
pants.”223 As with the workplace, mere access perpetuated women’s subordination.
Like the women auxiliaries of men’s organizations throughout the twentieth century,
female Jaycees’ associate status sent the message that they were unable to compete
as equals in the organization, the community, and the business place.224 By contrast,
the state argued, the experience of Jaycee “men and women meeting as equals” ad-
vanced antisubordination goals, by countering stereotypes about women’s capacities
and leading to higher-powered jobs for women through personal contacts.225 Re-
sponding to concerns that men would be deprived of opportunity, the plaintiffs
advanced a vision of a growing pie, rather than a zero sum game. Because “[a]n
essential, if not central function of the organization, is to grow through the acquisi-
tion of new members,” a larger pool of new members accrued to the Jaycees benefit,
Minnesota argued.226 Integrated Jaycees chapters had proven that women made
significant contributions to the growth and success of the organization, fostering “all
of the Jaycees’ goals except that of maintaining a sex-segregated leadership.”227
Lawyers proved adept at bringing women’s voices into the courtroom to illu-
minate the harms of organizational subordination. Just as legal historians have found
in contexts of abortion and prenatal leave, the Jaycees cases involved “popular dialogue
about the meaning of the Constitution’s guarantees, as citizens try to educate those
in power about harms not shared equally across lines of sex, race, and class.”228 The
Minnesota women who had become full members of their local Jaycees testified to
219 McClain, supra note 159, at 240.
220 See NOW Amicus Brief to Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 41.
221 Id. at 4–5.
222 Id. at 5.
223 Id.
224 See Epstein, supra note 44, at A2 (quoting Minnesota Attorney General’s office as
saying the practice “helps to perpetuate the myth that women are inferior”).
225 Id. at 12 n.14.
226 Brief of Appellees Marilyn E. McClure et al., supra note 175, at 17.
227 Id. at 20.
228 Reva B. Siegel & Linda Greenhouse, The Unfinished Story of Roe v. Wade, in
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 53, 62 (Melissa Murray et al. eds., 2019).
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the benefits.229 As a director of the rebel Minneapolis Jaycees, Kathleen Hawn chaired
numerous high-profile community events and came to supervise others for the first
time.230 Taking her supervisors to a Jaycees event where she received an award—an
honor that the U.S. Jaycees forbade her—directly contributed to her promotion to
a supervisory role.231 Interior architect, Kathryn Ebert similarly explained that no other
organization would have provided her with the opportunity to lead and supervise at
such a young age; the integrated atmosphere was key, providing exposure to how
men handled decisions and progressed in their professional careers—information
essential to her workplace where ninety percent of decision makers were male.232
These working women found their status in the labor force enhanced by their equal
membership in the local chapters—a status that U.S. Jaycees would deny them.
The integrated, but subordinated nature of the Jaycees proved determinative to
the courts’ consideration of the merits of the statutory claim and constitutional
defense. The hearing officer in Minnesota concluded that compelling a woman to
accept second-class status because of her sex was “perhaps an even more serious
concern” than placing women at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace—the
two harms justified the application of the state human rights act to the large, public-
facing U.S. Jaycees.233 In evaluating the constitutional issue, Chief Judge Lay in the
Eighth Circuit disagreed with his colleagues that the Jaycees’ freedom of association
was threatened by women’s membership, precisely because the Jaycees imposed
gender hierarchy on local chapters.234 If the U.S. Jaycees prevailed, male and female
members in Minneapolis and St. Paul would continue to associate with each other.235
But women would be denied the privileges of full membership and male members
who wished to associate with their female counterparts on equal terms would be
forbidden that opportunity.236
The Supreme Court notably emphasized the antisubordination values in its con-
struction of the Constitution.237 The pre-existing association of men and women
together, but unequal, mattered greatly to the Justices. In conference, Justices Brennan
and White both voted to reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision in favor of the Jaycees
because women’s membership belied any interest in selective membership or
229 Transcript of Hearing at 198, 201–04, Minnesota v. U.S. Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-6B
(Off. Hearing Examiners for Dep’t of Hum. Rts.).
230 Id. at 198, 204.
231 Id. at 201–03 (testifying that her supervisor’s boss who attended the dinner with her
“felt that the leadership abilities and the management skills I had shown through my parti-
cipation in the Jaycees would make me a good candidate for a position that he had in his
department” even though she did not have a college degree as others in the position did).
232 Id. at 188–95.
233 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, supra note 184, at *15.
234 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1580 (8th Cir. 1983) (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 610, 638 (1984).
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privacy.238 The opinion notes that in 1981, women associate members represented
about two percent of the Jaycees’ total membership.239 Having “already invite[d]
women to share the group’s views” and participate in much of their activity, Jaycees
could not complain of their full membership.240 Women’s equal access would not
diminish the opportunities of male Jaycees or destroy its purpose.241 Invoking its
Equal Protection cases, the Court reasoned that, “[D]iscrimination based on archaic
and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes
forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship
to their actual abilities.”242 These stereotypes—enforced in Jaycees through second-
class membership—harmed individual dignity and affected “participation in politi-
cal, economic, and cultural life.”243 Antisubordination values advanced through a
long social and legal movement had been vindicated. The connection of the Jaycees
to gender hierarchy in employment and across society—once invisible—had been
rendered evident.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the 1970s and early ’80s, the American public and, eventu-
ally, the judiciary came to understand statutory rights to public accommodations
equality as congruent, overlapping, and dynamic, with efforts toward economic
opportunity for women. State public accommodations law and the federal Civil
Rights Act—in the words of Professor Zick—“intersect[ed], associate[ed], [and]
convers[ed] . . . as part of a dynamic process of adjudication, scholarly examination,
and public discourse.”244 Linked to the labor market, the Jaycees’ structure of in-
cluding, but subordinating women came to be conceptualized as discriminatory. The
dynamism between employment and marketplace inclusion occurred, not through a
single court case, but through a widespread social and legal movement that shifted
the normative ground and made new realities possible.
238 Conference Notes of Justice Powell, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, No. 83-724, Apr. 20,
1984 (on file with Washington & Lee School of Law Library, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers)
(noting that Justice Brennan said that not selective and women already participate, Justice
White observed that no real privacy because women admitted); see also id. (reporting that
Justice Rehnquist said that Jaycees hadn’t “shown sufficient interest in either privacy or in
political issues” and “[t]his is a public organization—not privacy case”).
239 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
240 Id. at 627.
241 Id. at 620–21, 625–28.
242 Id. at 625.
243 Id. As Professor Appleton observes, the Court’s repeated references to “dignity”
reinforce understanding the opinion as vindicating antisubordination views. Appleton, supra
note 208, at 1432.
244 Zick, supra note 6, at 17.
2019] SEX SEGREGATION, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND ROBERTS 515
Roberts dramatically shrunk the boundaries of permissible sex segregation, but
legal and popular culture remained ambivalent about sex segregation.245 Indeed, the
Supreme Court would have to revisit the issue of men’s clubs in 1987 and again in
1988.246 It would take another decade from Roberts before men’s clubs fell out of
favor.247 Many people were not persuaded that sex-segregated membership organiza-
tions were wrongful in a moral (or legal) sense.248 They continued to see sex segregation
in childhood athletics, scouting, and schools as harmless, natural, or even admirable.
Influential men’s clubs—from the Jaycees to the Elks—sound anachronistic to
the modern reader. But viewed through the lens of employment discrimination and
economic opportunity, the movement to integrate these clubs and the Court’s decision
in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees become germane to today’s legal and social battles. As
Vicki Schultz has long argued, and as the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements now
recognize, sex segregation is “a cause and a consequence of harassment” and works
to deny women economic opportunities.249 Regular reports surface about public figures
and large employers affirmatively imposing sex segregation in activities outside of
the workplace or after business hours.250 Outside of work, sex-segregated activities,
245 See, e.g., David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 51, 51 (2011) (analyzing sex segregation); see also Katherine Rosman, Is
Women-Only Club the Wing Discriminating in a Bad Way?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/style/the-wing-investigation.html [https://perma.cc
/9KD7-WC6A] (describing women-only workspaces).
246 N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that the
application of a human rights law to a private club was not an unconstitutional infringement
on the rights of club members); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537
(1987) (deciding that a private organization was covered by the language of a California
Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or race).
247 Fred L. Somers, Jr., Open or Closed Door? In Club Wars, Privacy and Choice Battle
Freedom from Discrimination, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 1994, at 26–31 (defending the
practice of maintaining men-only clubs).
248 See, e.g., Boston Jaycees Take a Stand, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1978, at 18 (opining that
whether or not the Jaycees’ discrimination against women members is legal wrong, it should
be ended as inconsistent with equality of opportunity for women); see also John D. Inazu,
The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 186
(2010) (suggesting that the circumstances facing women and black people may have been
sufficiently different so as to warrant constitutional protection for the Jaycees’ sex dis-
crimination but not for clubs discriminating based on race). For contemporaneous and recent
scholarly commentary, see Linder, supra note 9, at 1902 (“Most men would also willingly
sacrifice a degree of associational freedom in order to provide women with the same eco-
nomic opportunities that they have long enjoyed. When, however, a state acts to prohibit
private discrimination which does not reflect a mean-spiritedness toward the excluded group,
the cost may be too much to pay.”).
249 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 22, 49
(2018); see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1756–60 (1998); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2132–36,
2139–45, 2173–77 (2003).
250 Working Relationships in the #MeToo Era, LEAN IN, https://leanin.org/sexual-harass
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athletics, and networks affect women’s career progress.251 Genuinely exclusive clubs—
like the Mar-a-Lago of the Trumps, the Skull and Bones of the Bushes and Yale Uni-
versity, and the Bohemian Club of senators and presidents—hold outsized power over
political and economic opportunity.252 Like the earlier campaign against men’s clubs,
the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements resist women’s lack of access to spaces where
opportunity is formed and their continued underrepresentation in leadership positions.253
The long Jaycees campaign holds lessons for contemporary feminist movements.
It demonstrates the role of pragmatism in achieving equality. The focus on fair play
and the structures of subordination helpfully sidelined discussions of animus and
intent. The movement identified traditions and structures of sex segregation and
subordination that held women back in employment, notwithstanding their formal
equal access to the workplace.254 By surfacing the ways public accommodations
inequality cut against the grain of framework civil rights protections, the movement
convinced the media and many people that integrating men’s clubs was correct as
a policy matter.255 The congruence between economic opportunity and Jaycees mem-
bership helped tip the balance at the Supreme Court and resulted in a distinctly
antisubordinating decision that might aid today’s movements in their efforts to chal-
lenge continued sex segregation.
ment-backlash-survey-results [https://perma.cc/PZN9-MZDL] (last visited Dec. 4, 2019)
(reporting that nearly half of male managers surveyed reported feeling “uncomfortable par-
ticipating in a common work activity with a woman, such as mentoring, working alone, or
socializing together”).
251 See Judith G. Oakley, Gender-Based Barriers to Senior Management Positions: Under-
standing the Scarcity of Female CEOs, 27 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 328 (2000) (describing
“informal male social system that stretches within and across organizations, and excludes
less powerful males and all women from membership”); see also Elizabeth H. Gorman &
Julie A. Kmec, Hierarchical Rank and Women’s Organizational Mobility: Glass Ceilings
in Corporate Law Firms, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1428, 1429 (2009) (finding social networks to
retard women’s career mobility in law firms).
252 See McClain, supra note 159, at 2415 (discussing the meaning of Roberts for social
and professional networks that continue to limit women’s access to advancement today).
253 Tippett, infra note 254, at 5–6.
254 For examples of scholars considering such possibilities, see Anthony Michael Kreis,
Defensive Glass Ceilings, 88 G.W. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that many defensive
practices of segregating supervisors from people to whom they might be attracted violate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Elizabeth C. Tippett, Opportunity Discrimination: A Hidden
Liability Employers Can Fix, EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that
disparities in informal opportunities related to the work place are legally significant for pur-
poses of Title VII and should be distributed more equitably by employers). See also Theresa
M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions or Privileges of Employment Under
Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 663–67 (1996) (discussing employment discrimination cases
involving gendered outside-employment activities with bosses and colleagues).
255 See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 64; One Small Step for Womankind, supra note 65.
